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Although supply disruption is ubiquitous because of natural or man-made disasters,
many firms still use the price-only reverse auction (only the cost is considered) to make
purchase decisions. We first study the suppliers’ equilibrium bidding strategies and the
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buyer’s expected revenue under the first- and second-price price-only reverse auctions
when the suppliers are unreliable and have private information on their costs and disrup-
tion probabilities. We show that the two auctions are equivalent and not efficient. Then
we propose two easily implementable reverse auctions, namely the first-price and second-
price format announced penalty reverse auction (APRA), and show that the “revenue
equivalence principle” holds, i.e., the two auctions generate the same ex ante expected
profit to the buyer. We further show that the two reverse auctions are efficient and
“truth telling” is the suppliers’ dominant strategy in the second-price format APRA.
We conduct numerical studies to assess the impacts of some parameters on the bidding
strategies, the buyer’s profit and social profit.
Keywords: Supply risk management; mechanism design; reverse auction; game theory.
1. Introduction
Because of economic globalization, and increasing natural and man-made accidents,
the supply failure risk has increased and the reliability of suppliers has become more
uncertain (Chaturvedi and Mart´ınez-de Albe´niz, 2011; Simchi-Levi et al., 2014).
For example, Mattel experienced a considerable shortage of supply during a peak
sale season, and it severely stroke its financial performance (Bapuji and Beamish,
2008). In fact, such disruption incidents were ubiquitous in the past decades, sig-
nificantly impacting global supply chains and posting great challenges to supply
chain risk management. Hendricks and Singhal (2003) reported that disruptions
caused by the contracted suppliers might on average decrease about 12% share-
holders’ returns of the sourcing firms. In view of this, many firms take supply
disruption risk into consideration when they make decisions on supplier selection,
and supply disruption management has attracted considerable research attention
(Sawik, 2014).
Recently more and more firms have used the reverse auction to procure goods or
services (Santamar´ıa, 2015). For example, Sun Microsystems and Hewlett-Packard
(HP) have exploited specific online auctions to sell and buy products and materials
worth hundreds of millions of dollars (Chen, 2014). Beall et al. (2003) reported that
an average of 5% of total corporate spending was sourced by reverse auctions in
2003. Companies like Target, Dell, and General Electric are also said to use reverse
auctions liberally. Pham et al. (2015) pointed out that the reverse auction is so
popular because it has excellent potential to save purchase cost compared with
traditional procurement approaches. Jap (2000) also found that the reverse auction
can not only save the buyer’s money but also increase the competitiveness of the
supply base by forcing suppliers to bid for contracts.
While the reverse auction has been widely adopted in business and it per-
forms excellently in saving procurement cost, the majority of the various forms
of the reverse auction are conducted in the price-only regime without consider-
ing other attributes (Pham et al., 2015; Beil and Wein, 2003). Price-only auctions
have faced criticism since they may lead to some problems such as the lack of
trust and long-term relationship between the buyer and suppliers (Smeltzer et al.,
2002; Pham et al., 2015). Consequently, many experts have proposed to extend the
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price-only reverse auction to the cases where other nonmonetary attributes such as
product quality, lead-time, and payment schedule are considered, and studied the
multi-attribute reverse auction.
The economics and operations management literature on the multi-attribute
auction mainly focus on two streams: optimal mechanism and efficient mechanism
(Xu and Huang, 2017). The first stream of works adopt score function to determine
the winner of auctions and prove the utility equivalence between different auction
formats (Che, 1993; Asker and Cantillon, 2008). The second stream of works focus
on the design of efficient multi-attribute reverse auctions because efficient auctions
can yield high revenue for the buyer in the long run (Parkes and Kalagnanam, 2005;
Xu and Huang, 2017; Zhang et al., 2019). These studies ignore the attribute of sup-
ply disruption risk, and do not study the optimality and efficiency of the mechanism
simultaneously. To our best knowledge, Chaturvedi and Mart´ınez-de Albe´niz (2011)
is the only paper that studies order allocation under the optimal procurement mech-
anism considering supply disruption risk. However, they do not study the efficiency
of the mechanism.
Despite the ubiquity of supply disruption risk, a large number of firms ignore
this factor and use the price-only auction to select supplier(s) when designing their
procurement mechanisms. In this context, the buyer faces the following questions:
(1) What is the supplier’s equilibrium bidding strategy under the price-only reverse
auction? (2) Which auction format should it adopt, the first-price reverse auction
or the second-price reverse auction? (3) Is the price-only reverse auction efficient?
(4) What is the efficient reverse auction?
At the same time, with growing globalization and increasing popularity of out-
sourcing, firms tend to purchase materials from and sell products to the global
market. It is very difficult to obtain complete information about suppliers’ costs
and disruption probabilities. This asymmetric information may lead to significant
damage to buyers (Yang et al., 2009). Most of the literature on supply risk man-
agement assumes that the suppliers’ costs and disruption probabilities are complete
information. In this paper we assume that the suppliers’ costs and supply disruption
probabilities are their private information. That is, only suppliers themselves know
their costs and supply disruption probabilities, and the buyer and other suppliers
do not know this information.
In summary, we study the multi-attribute reverse auction design problem of
a buyer facing a set of unreliable suppliers, whose production costs and supply
disruption probabilities are private information. We show that the first- and second-
price price-only auctions are equivalent, and they are not efficient. Then we propose
two mechanisms, the first- and second-price announced penalty reverse auctions, and
show that they are efficient and generate the same ex ante expected revenue, i.e.,
the “revenue equivalence principle” holds. The idea of the new mechanisms is simple
and they are easy to implement in, that is, the buyer announces a penalty for the
winner that cannot execute the contract.
1950013-3
June 20, 2019 11:46 WSPC/S0217-5959 APJOR 1950013.tex
J. Xiang et al.
Compared with the existing literature, our work makes the following contribu-
tions:
(1) We first propose a supplier selection mechanism under supply disruption risk
for the case where the suppliers’ costs and disruption probabilities are private
information. The majority of studies on supplier selection under supply dis-
ruption assume that suppliers’ costs and disruption probabilities are common
knowledge.
(2) We characterize the equilibrium bidding strategies under the first- and second-
price reverse auctions. We also show that the two auctions are revenue equiva-
lent and they are not efficient. This means that the commonly used price-only
reverse auctions in practice are problematic when the suppliers are unreliable.
(3) We propose two new efficient multi-attribute auctions that can help the buyer
to jointly evaluate the suppliers’ costs and supply reliabilities when selecting
suppliers. Unlike the existing studies on multi-attribute auctions, which use a
score function to select the winner, the new auctions select the supplier with
the lowest bidding price as the winner. The auctioneer only needs to announce
a penalty for the undelivered order. The implementation of the new auctions
is easy compared with the existing multi-attribute auctions because it is very
difficult to choose a proper score function for the latter.
(4) We show that the new auctions, i.e., the first- and the second-price APRAs,
generate the same ex ante expected profits. This extends the “revenue equiv-
alence principle” to multi-attribute auctions. Also, the two auctions are effi-
cient and can yield high revenues to the buyer (Parkes and Kalagnanam,
2005; Xu and Huang, 2017). Moreover, the incentive compatibility holds for
the second-price APRA, i.e., bidding the expected unit cost is the dominant
strategy.
We organize the rest of the paper as follows: In Sec. 2 we give a concise review
of the closely related literature. Then we introduce the assumptions and notations,
and discuss the price-only reverse auction model in Sec. 3. We present the new
auctions and analyze their properties in Sec. 4. We present the results of numerical
studies and derive managerial insights from the analytical findings in Sec. 5. We
conclude the paper and suggest topics for future research in Sec. 6.
2. Literature Review
In this paper we study the buyer’s problem of procurement mechanism design facing
suppliers whose production costs and supply disruption probabilities are private
information. Two streams of literature are highly related to this work.
The first stream is on the reverse auction or procurement auction. Since the
reverse auction has been adopted extensively as the main procurement mechanism
in industries since the end of the last century (Smeltzer et al., 2002), it has attracted
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considerable research efforts and have produced a large body of literature. Jap
(2002), Pham et al. (2015), and Teich et al. (2004) provided extensive reviews on
this topic. We review in the following the studies closely related to our work.
Che (1993) extended the price-only reverse auction to consider quality as an
attribute and used a score function to select the winner. He showed that the first-
score, second-score, and second-preferred-offer auctions yield the same expected
utility to the buyer when the buyer lacks commitment power. David et al. (2006)
generalized Che’s results to the case with more than two quality attributes, and
showed that the buyer’s expected payoff in the first-score, second-score, and English
auctions differ only by a predefined constant. Budde and Minner (2014) consid-
ered a newsvendor-type retailer sourcing from a set of suppliers with private cost
information. They compared combinations of different reverse auction formats (the
first- and second-price) and risk sharing supply contracts (pull and push) under
full contract compliance with a risk-neutral retailer and risk-averse suppliers. They
showed that the first-price format is more preferred in most cases. Lorentziadis
(2014) studied the bidding strategies when the buyer may default and fail to pay
the winner the contractual amount. They showed that the ex ante expected payment
for the first-price auction is lower than that for the second-price auction. Dang et al.
(2015) studied the price-only reverse auction with different ending rules and value
assumptions. They found that the first-price online auction with soft-close endings
under private value is strategically equivalent to the English auction with a reserve
price. Qian et al. (2018) examined the impacts of suppliers’ anticipated regrets on
their bidding strategies and the buyer’s expected cost. They showed that the “rev-
enue equivalence principle” does not hold when the winners’ regrets differ from the
losers’ regrets.
Nishimura (2015) studied the optimal design of the scoring auction for pub-
lic and private procurement. Asker and Cantillon (2008) studied the equilibrium
behavior for the scoring auction and proved that any two scoring auctions that use
the same quasi-linear scoring rule will generate the same expected utility for the
buyer. Katok and Roth (2004) compared the performance of two forms of the Dutch
auction using experiments and showed the descending-price auction performs well
in a variety of environments. Beil and Wein (2003) proposed the multi-round open-
ascending auction mechanism and showed that it is efficient to maximize the buyer’s
utility. Kostamis et al. (2009) compared the first-price open-bid and the first-price
sealed-bid total-cost procurement auctions considering two attributes, i.e., price
and fixed cost adjustment, and showed that open-bid is better than sealed-bid only
when the expected information rent in the open-bid case is greater than that in the
sealed-bid case, and vice versa. Nassiri-Mofakham et al. (2015) studied the bidding
strategy for agents for the multi-attribute combinatorial double auction.
Chen et al. (2005) proposed an efficient mechanism for supply chain procure-
ment incorporating the transport cost. Parkes and Kalagnanam (2005) studied on
efficient iterative auctions for the single-unit procurement. Xu and Huang (2017)
proposed three efficient auctions for the multi-unit procurement. Zhang et al. (2019)
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proposed an optimal and efficient auction for the multi-unit transport procurement
with private information on the suppliers’ capacities. The above studies ignore the
attribute of supply disruption risk. Xiang [2018] proposed a VCG-based efficient
auction to the buyer to select suppliers among unreliable suppliers. We consider a
much simpler format with easy-implementation in this paper.
The second stream of literature is on supply disruption risk management. As
supply chain risk is very important for firms because of strategic outsourcing, glob-
alization of markets, and increasing reliance on suppliers (Narasimhan and Talluri,
2009), many scholars have studied this problem and produced a large body
of literature. Tang (2006), Narasimhan and Talluri (2009), Snyder et al. (2016),
Tang and Musa (2011), and Fahimnia et al. (2015) provided extensive reviews on
this topic. In the following we only review papers that are closely related to our
study.
Supplier selection is an important problem when the buyer faces a set of suppliers
with disruption risk. Sawik (2014) studied the supplier selection problem in a make-
to-order system where the suppliers may suffer from disruption. He modeled the
problem as a mix integer program. Sarkar and Mohapatra (2009) examined the opti-
mal size of the supply base facing supply disruption. Federgruen and Yang (2014)
considered the supplier selection problem over an infinite horizon with uncertain
demand and supply, and characterized the structure of the optimal policy. Tomlin
(2006), Babich et al. (2007), Chen and Guo (2014), Tang et al. (2014), Burke et al.
(2009), Meena et al. (2011), and Hu et al. (2013) studied the effect of dual-sourcing
or multi-sourcing on the mitigation of supply disruption risk. All these works assume
that the buyer knows the suppliers’ disruption probabilities.
There a lot of researches focusing on supply disruption risk management under
asymmetric/incomplete information. Lim (2001) studied the cooperative contract
design problem under incomplete information about product quality. Tomlin (2009)
used the Bayesian model to examine the effects of information updating on dual-
sourcing and single-sourcing strategies. Yang et al. (2012) studied the effects of
asymmetric information and the correlation of disruption on the buyer’s decisions,
and concluded that the problem can be viewed as a choice between diversification
and competition. Chen (2014) examined the influences of information asymmetry
on the supplier’s belief, the control of backup production, and the verifiability of
supply disruption. Yang and Murthy (2014) investigated the supplier’s and buyer’s
reactions to supply chain disruption under asymmetric information about the sever-
ity of disruption. Gurnani and Shi (2006) studied the first-time interaction between
the supplier and the buyer when they have different estimates of the disruption risk.
Gu¨mu¨s¸ et al. (2012) studied the value of price and quantity (P&Q) guarantee when
the buyer seeks to procure from two suppliers (one is cheap and unreliable, while
the other is expensive and reliable). Gurnani et al. (2012) analyzed the allocation
problem under symmetric and asymmetric information, respectively. Chen et al.
(2010) explored the decisions of dual-sourcing and inventory management of a man-
ufacturer when facing unreliable supplies and proposed to use a Bayesian model to
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dynamically update the information on the supply risk. Huang and Xu (2015) stud-
ied the optimal procurement contract design problem when the manufacturer or the
supplier can initiate the enhancement of supply reliability. Yang et al. (2009) stud-
ied the information screening problem for the case where a manufacturer faces a
reliable supplier and an unreliable supplier, and has incomplete information on the
unreliable supplier’s disruption probability. The above studies do not study the
reverse auction design when considering the supply disruption.
To the best of our knowledge, Chaturvedi and Mart´ınez-de Albe´niz (2011) is
the only paper that studies the optimal procurement allocation problem consider-
ing supply disruption risk. They designed the optimal mechanism that depends on
the buyer’s level of information about the suppliers’ production costs and reliability.
They showed that when the suppliers’ reliabilities are known or unknown but inde-
pendent, the optimal allocation is similar to that under full information. They also
conducted numerical experiments to assess the benefits of the optimal mechanism
in comparison with the traditional price-only auction that ignores supply risk.
We also consider the procurement mechanism design for the case where the buyer
faces a set of suppliers with supply disruption risk and has incomplete informa-
tion on the suppliers’ production costs and disruption probabilities. But there are
major differences between Chaturvedi and Mart´ınez-de Albe´niz (2011) and ours.
They focused on order allocation under the optimal mechanism with different infor-
mation structures. We study the revenue equivalence properties under different
auction mechanisms and propose an efficient and easy-to-implement auction mech-
anism to help the buyer choose a supplier.
3. Assumptions and Price-Only Auction
Despite that supply disruption risk is ubiquitous, the price-only auction is commonly
used in practice (Pham et al., 2015). Chaturvedi and Mart´ınez-de Albe´niz (2011)
used the price-only auction as the benchmark for comparison with their proposed
mechanism. In this section, we study the equilibrium bidding strategies, the buyer’s
profit, and the efficiency of the first- and second-price price-only auctions with
supply disruption risk.
Suppose that a buyer wants to buy one unit item from a set of N potential
unreliable suppliers (the order is indivisible). The order may be undelivered by the
selected supplier because of various potential disruption incidents that may occur
during its production and/or transport such as loss of the product in transit, imper-
fect quality, natural disaster. Let supplier i’s disruption probability be θi and unit
production cost be ci, which are private information (only known to the supplier
itself). The buyer and the other suppliers only know that (ci, θi) are random vari-
ables over (0, ωc) × (0, 1)a (Chaturvedi and Mart´ınez-de Albe´niz, 2011), where ωc
aAs we know, there are some situations that the costs and the disruption probabilities are depen-
dent. Here, we assume that the suppliers’ production cost is independent of their disruption
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Fig. 1. The sequence of events.
is the upper bound of the production cost. We assume that suppliers are symmet-
ric and independent, i.e., ci(θi) (i = 1, 2, . . . , N) follows the same random variable
C(Θ) with the distribution function Fc(Fθ) and density function fc(fθ). Also, we
focus on the symmetric bidding strategies in this paper.
The sequence of events is as follows (Fig. 1): First, the buyer announces the
auction rule. Second, suppliers submit bids of their wholesale prices in the sealed
format and let supplier i’s bid be bi. Third, the supplier with the lowest bid wins
and signs a contract with the buyer.b The payment is the winner’s bid or the sec-
ond lowest bid, which is determined by the first-price or the second-price auction
format adopted by the buyer. Fourth, the winner produces the product and pre-
pares to deliver it, which incurs a cost ci. The contract is executed if no disruption
happens. When disruption events happen, the winner is not able to execute the
contract. Thus, there is no delivery and no payment, and the buyer suffers a loss l
(Federgruen and Yang, 2014; Tomlin, 2006; Huang and Xu, 2015).
3.1. First-price format
In this subsection we study the suppliers’ equilibrium bidding strategies and the
buyer’s ex ante expected profit for the first-price price-only auction. In this case,
the wholesale price will be exactly the winner’s bid. When supplier i has information
(ci, θi) and bids bi, its expected payoff is
ΠP1i (bi) =
{
(1− θi)bi − ci if bi < min
j =i
bj,
0 otherwise,
(1)
where P1 indicates the first-price price-only reverse auction.
probability to simplify analysis. Chaturvedi and Mart´ınez-de Albe´niz (2011) also adopts such an
assumption.
bIf any tie bids happen, the order goes to one of the suppliers with same probability.
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To simplify the analysis, we define zi = ci1−θi as supplier i’s virtual cost. The
exact value of the virtual cost is only known to supplier i, and the buyer and other
suppliers do not know it. But the buyer and the other suppliers know the distribu-
tions of ci and θi, they can easily deduce that zi follows the distribution function
FZi . Because ci(i = 1, . . . , N) follows the same distribution FC and θi(i = 1, . . . , N)
follows the same distribution Fθ, zi(i = 1, . . . , N) follows the same distribution FZ .
Let the random variable Yi denote the lowest value of the virtual cost of the other
N − 1 suppliers except supplier i. In other words, Yi is the lowest order statistics
of Z1, . . . , Zi−1, Zi+1, . . . , ZN . Let G denote the distribution function of Yi, so, for
any value of y, we have G(y) = 1− (1−FZ(y))N−1. Note that ci is supplier i’s unit
production cost and 1− θi is supplier i’s successful delivery probability, the virtual
cost zi represents supplier i’s expected unit cost of successfully delivering the prod-
uct to the buyer. It is increasing in the unit production cost ci and decreasing in
the successful delivery probability 1− θi.
Proposition 1 gives supplier i’s equilibrium bidding strategy in the first-price
price-only auction.
Proposition 1. Supplier i’s equilibrium bidding strategy for the first-price price-
only reverse auction is
βP1(zi) =
1
1−G(zi)
∫ ∞
zi
xg(x)dx. (2)
Proof. Note that supplier i’s payoff function can be rewritten as follows:
ΠP1i (bi) =
{
(1− θi)(bi − zi) if bi < min
j =i
bj,
0 otherwise.
Since the successful delivery probability (1 − θi) only affects the amount of the
payoff when supplier i wins and does not affect the winning probability, supplier i’s
bidding strategy bi will not change when θi and ci change but zi does not change.
Thus, supplier i’s equilibrium bidding strategy is a function of zi, i.e., bi = β(zi).
We first prove that β(z) is an increasing function. Assume that the suppliers’
virtual costs are z1, z2, . . . , zN . Consider supplier 1’s equilibrium bidding strategy,
i.e., β(z1). When supplier 1’s virtual cost increases to z′1 (z
′
1 > z1) while the other
N − 1 suppliers’ virtual costs remain unchanged, its equilibrium bidding strategy is
β(z′1). We need to prove that β(z
′
1) ≥ β(z1). Conversely, suppose that β(z′1) < β(z1).
Let b¯−1 = mini=1{β(zi)}. There are three cases:
(1) b¯−1 ≤ β(z′1) < β(z1), supplier 1 still loses the auction;
(2) β(z′1) < b¯−1 < β(z1), supplier 1 will win the auction by bidding β(z
′
1) < β(z1).
Note that (1 − θ1)(β(z1) − z1) ≥ 0 in equilibrium, combining the fact that
β(z′1) < β(z1) and z
′
1 > z1, we can derive that β(z
′
1) − z′1 < β(z1) − z1, which
means that there exists a positive probability that supplier 1 earns a negative
profit;
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(3) β(z′1) < β(z1) ≤ b¯−1, supplier 1 still wins the auction. However, it makes a
lower profit by bidding β(z′1) < β(z1).
Then supplier 1 does not have the incentive to bid β(z′1) < β(z1).
Supplier i wins the auction if and only if its bid is the lowest, i.e., bi <
minj =i β(zj). This implies that zi = β−1(bi) < Yi. Then its expected payoff is
ΠP1i (bi) = (1−G(β−1(bi)))(1 − θi)(bi − zi). (3)
Taking the first derivative of Eq. (3) with respect to bi yields the first-order condition
(1−G(β−1(bi))) +
(
0− g(β
−1(bi))
β′(β−1(bi))
)
(bi − zi) = 0.
Substituting β−1(bi) = zi into the equation, we have
β′(zi)(1−G(zi))− g(zi)(β(zi)− zi) = 0.
Then
β′(zi)(G(zi)− 1) + g(zi)β(zi) = g(zi)zi.
d
dzi
β(zi)(G(zi)− 1) = g(zi)zi.
Noting that G(zi) = 1 when zi → ∞ and taking integration on both sides, we
obtain
β(zi) =
1
1−G(zi)
∫ ∞
zi
xg(x)dx. (4)
Then
β(zi) =
1
1−G(zi)
(∫ ∞
0
xg(x)dx −
∫ zi
0
xg(x)dx
)
=
1
1−G(zi)
(
E[Yi]− ziG(zi) +
∫ zi
0
G(x)dx
)
=
1
1−G(zi)
(
E[Yi]− ziG(zi) + zi − zi +
∫ zi
0
G(x)dx
)
= zi +
1
1−G(zi)
(
E[Yi]−
∫ zi
0
1dx+
∫ zi
0
G(x)dx
)
= zi +
E[Yi]−
∫ zi
0
(1−G(x))dx
1−G(zi) .
In the following we shall show that if the other N − 1 suppliers follow the bidding
strategy β, it is optimal for supplier i with the virtual cost zi to bid β(zi).
As β is an increasing and continuous function, the bidder with the lowest virtual
cost submits the lowest bid and wins the auction. It is never optimal for supplier i
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to bid bi < β(0) since it will result in a negative payoff. Then we can assume that
supplier i bids bi ≥ β(0) when its virtual cost is zi. Let z′i satisfy bi = β(z′i). Then
supplier i’s expected payoff is
ΠP1i (bi) = (1− θi)(1−G(z′i))(β(z′i)− zi)
= (1− θi)(1−G(z′i))
(
z′i +
E[Yi]−
∫ z′i
0
(1−G(x))dx
1−G(z′i)
− zi
)
= (1− θi)(1−G(z′i))
(
(1−G(z′i))(z′i − zi) + E[Yi]−
∫ zi
0 (1−G(x))dx
1−G(z′i)
)
= (1− θi)
(
(1−G(z′i))(z′i − zi) + E[Yi]−
∫ zi
0
(1−G(x))dx
)
.
Then we could get
ΠP1i (β(zi))−ΠP1i (β(z′i)) = (1− θi)
[
G(z′i)(z
′
i − zi)−
∫ z′i
zi
G(x)dx
]
. (5)
We consider two cases: z′i ≥ zi and z′i < zi.
(1) z′i ≥ zi. Since G(·) is a nondecreasing function, we have G(z′i) ≥ G(zi) and∫ z′i
zi
G(x)dx ≤
∫ z′i
zi
G(z′i)dx
= G(z′i)(z
′
i − zi).
(2) z′i < zi. In this case, we have G(z
′
i) < G(zi) and∫ z′i
zi
G(x)dx = −
∫ zi
z′i
G(x)dx
≤ −
∫ zi
z′i
G(z′i)dx
= −G(z′i)(zi − z′i)
= G(z′i)(z
′
i − zi).
For both cases, we have
ΠPi (β(zi))−ΠPi (β(z′i)) = (1− θi)
[
G(z′i)(z
′
i − zi)−
∫ z′i
zi
G(x)dx
]
≥ 0.
Thus, we proved the proposition.
It is well known that the suppliers’ biding strategies are determined by their
production costs and the supplier with the lowest production cost will win the
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auction in the first (second) price-only auction if we assume that the suppliers
are reliable. Taking suppliers’ supply disruption into consideration, Proposition 1
implies that the supply disruption probabilities also influence the suppliers’ bidding
strategies and the supplier with the lowest virtual cost, not unit production cost,
will win the auction even though the buyer adopts the price-only auction. Then
the supplier with a lower disruption probability will bid lower and has a higher
probability to win the auction. Note that the results in Proposition 1 reduce to the
results in the traditional price-only auction without considering supply disruption
when all suppliers are reliable, i.e., θi = 0 for i = 1, 2, . . . , N . Then Proposition 1
generalizes the results in the traditional price-only auction assuming reliable supply
to the case with supply disruption risk.
Now, we calculate the buyer’s ex ante expected profit. From Proposition 1, the
expected profit that the buyer can make from supplier i if it wins the auction is
ΠP1M = (1− θi)(r − wP1 (ci, θi))− θil, (6)
where wP1(ci, θi) denotes the wholesale price, which equals supplier i’s bid, i.e.,
wP1(ci, θi) = β(zi) = 11−G(zi)
∫∞
zi
xg(x)dx, and r is the unit revenue brought by the
product, and l is the unit loss resulting from unsatisfied demand. The subscript M
indicates the buyer. Note that supplier i’s winning probability is (1−G( ci1−θi )) and
the buyer’s ex ante expected profit is
E[ΠP1M ] = N
∫ 1
0
∫ ωc
0
(
1−G
(
c
1− θ
))
× ((1− θ)(r − wP1 (c, θ))− θl)fc(c)fθ(θ)dcdθ. (7)
3.2. Second-price format
In this subsection we study the suppliers’ equilibrium bidding strategies and the
buyer’s expected profit for the second-price price-only auction. In this case, the
lowest bid will win the auction and the wholesale price will be the second lowest
bid.
When bidding bi, the payoff of supplier i with (ci, θi) is
ΠP2i (bi) =
{
(1− θi)b¯−i − ci if bi < min
j =i
bj,
0 otherwise,
(8)
where b¯−i is the second lowest bid, i.e., the lowest bid among the other N − 1
suppliers except i, and P2 indicates the second-price price-only reverse auction. The
following proposition characterizes the suppliers’ equilibrium bidding strategies.
Proposition 2. Supplier i’s equilibrium bidding strategy in the second-price price-
only reverse auction is given by
βP2 (ci, θi) = zi =
1
1− θi . (9)
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Proof. Consider supplier 1, say, and suppose that y = minj =1 bj is the second
lowest bid. By bidding z1, supplier 1 wins the auction if z1 < y and loses it otherwise.
Suppose, however, that supplier 1 bids an amount z′′ < z1. There are three
cases:
(1) z′′ < z1 < y, supplier 1 still wins the auction and the wholesale price is still y.
It cannot obtain more profit;
(2) z′′ < y < z1, supplier 1 will win the auction. However, by simple calculation,
y − z1 < 0, we can find that its profit is negative;
(3) y < z′′ < z1, supplier 1 still loses the auction and cannot obtain more profit.
Summarizing the above analysis, we see that supplier 1 will not bid less than
z1. On the other hand, if supplier 1 bids an amount z′′ > z1. There are also three
cases:
(1) z1 < z′′ < y, supplier 1 still wins without obtaining more profit. However, its
winning probability will decrease instead;
(2) z1 < y < z′′, supplier 1 will lose the auction and its profit decreases;
(3) y < z1 < z′′, supplier 1 still loses the auction and cannot obtain more profit.
The above means supplier will never bid larger than zi. Thus, we have proved
that supplier 1’s dominant strategy is to bid zi.
Proposition 2 implies that the dominant strategy for a supplier is to bid its
virtual cost in the second-price reverse auction. As the virtual cost is the expected
cost of successfully delivering one unit of the product to the buyer, the second-price
reverse auction is incentive compatible in this context. This extends the results in
the traditional price-only auction without considering supply disruption risk to the
case where supply disruption is taken into consideration.
Note that the wholesale price is wP2 (ci, θi) = E[Yi|zi < Yi] if supplier i is the
winner in the second-price format. So the expected profit the buyer can make from
supplier i, if it wins the auction, is
ΠP2M = (1− θi)(r − E[Yi|zi < Yi])− θil. (10)
By similar arguments in Sec. 3.1, we obtain the buyer’s ex ante expected profit
as follows:
E[ΠP2M ] = N
∫ 1
0
∫ ωc
0
(
1−G
(
c
1− θ
))
× ((1− θ)(r − wP2(c, θ)) − θl)fc(c)fθ(θ)dcdθ. (11)
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3.3. Performance analysis
By comparing the ex ante expected profits in the first-price and second-price format
price-only auctions, we have the following proposition. It states that the revenue
equivalence principle holds in the price-only auction with supply disruption.
Proposition 3 (Revenue Equivalence). In the price-only reverse auction with
supply disruption, both the first- and second-price formats generate the same ex ante
expected profit for the buyer.
Proof. We prove the proposition by showing that wP1 (c, θ) = wP2(c, θ). From the
analysis from Secs. 3.1 and 3.2, we know that the expected payment in the first-price
auction is
wP1(c, θ) =
1
1−G(zi)
∫ ∞
zi
xg(x)dx.
While the expected payment in the second-price auction is
wP2 (ci, θi) = E[Yi|zi < Yi]
=
∫∞
zi
tg(t)dt
Pro(Yi > zi)
=
∫∞
zi
xg(x)dx
1−G(zi)
= wP1(c, θ).
Then the proposition is proved.
As pointed out by Krishna (2009), the “revenue equivalence principle” is very
important for a firm to choose the auction format. It is well known that the “revenue
equivalence principle” holds if we do not consider supply disruption. Che (1993) and
David et al. (2006) extended the principle to the case where quality is the nonprice
attribute. Although they considered the multi-attribute reverse auction, they only
study one uncertain parameter that is known privately to the suppliers. In other
words, the suppliers’ private information is one-dimensional. Proposition 3 extends
the “revenue equivalence principle” to the case where suppliers’ production costs
and disruption probabilities are private information.
It is well known that the price-only auction is efficient, i.e., the supplier with
the lowest cost is chosen as the winner when suppliers are reliable and the private
information is their production costs. If we consider supply disruption risk, the pri-
vate information owned by suppliers contains their supply disruption probabilities.
Is the price-only auction still efficient for this case? This is an important question
that needs to be answered. Note that a supplier is called the most efficient supplier
among a set of suppliers if it generates the highest social welfare, i.e., the highest
1950013-14
June 20, 2019 11:46 WSPC/S0217-5959 APJOR 1950013.tex
Efficient Multi-Attribute Auctions Considering Supply Disruption
Table 1. A simple example.
Supplier Production Disruption Virtual cost zi
i cost ci probability θi
1 0.79 0.2 0.9875
2 0.9 0.1 1
3 0.88 0.2 1.1
expected total profit of the supply chain consisting of the buyer and the supplier.
A mechanism is called efficient if it selects the most efficient supplier as the winner
(Xu and Huang, 2017).
Obviously, a supplier with the lowest production cost as well as the lowest dis-
ruption probability is the most efficient supplier by definition. However, if there
is no such supplier in a set of suppliers, it is not obvious as to which supplier is
the most efficient supplier between one that has a low cost but a high disruption
probability and another that has a high cost but a low disruption probability.
The following example illustrates that the price-only auction may not be efficient
for the case where there is potential supply disruption risk. Since the first- and
second-price formats are equivalent, we consider only the second-price format. In
this case, supplier i’s equilibrium strategy is β(zi) = zi = ci1−θi .
Example 1. Suppose that there are three suppliers with unit production costs and
supply disruption probabilities given in Table 1. The unit revenue and loss are r = 2
and l = 1, respectively.
It is obvious that supplier 1 will win the auction. The buyer’s profit is 1× [(1−
0.2)(2 − 1) − 0.2] = 0.6, the supplier’s profit is 1 × [(1 − 0.2)1 − 0.79] = 0.01, and
the total profit of the supply chain is 0.61.
However, if supplier 2 secures the contract, the buyer earns 1 × [(1 − 0.1)(2 −
1.1)−0.1] = 0.71 and the supplier’s profit is 1×[(1−0.1)1.1−0.88] = 0.11. The total
profit of the supply chain is 0.82 > 0.61. This shows that the price-only auction
cannot select the most efficient supplier as the winner, so it is not efficient.
The reason is that supplier 1, which has a low production cost but a high disrup-
tion probability, bids low and wins the contract because there is no penalty for the
undelivered order in the price-only auction. In order to overcome the inefficiency of
the price-only auction, we propose the announced penalty reverse auction (APRA)
as a new auction mechanism in the following section.
4. Announced Penalty Reverse Auction
In this section we consider a new reverse auction mechanism, i.e., the APRA, and
analyze its performance. As pointed out before, the supplier with a low production
cost but a high disruption probability might bid low and win the auction because
there is no penalty for the winner if it is disrupted and cannot deliver the product in
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the price-only auction. This will result in inefficiency of the mechanism. A common
and naive solution is to announce a penalty in advance if the winner fails to execute
the contract. Based on this motivation, we propose the APRA to help the buyer to
choose the most efficient supplier and manage supply disruption risk.
The APRA works as follows: First, the buyer announces a unit penalty p0 for
the undelivered order and the auction format (the first- or the second-price). Then,
each supplier bids its wholesale price. Third, the supplier with the lowest bid will
be selected as the winner and sign a contract with the buyer according to the first-
or second-price format. Fourth, the winner delivers the product and receives the
payment from the buyer if no disruption happens, or pays the penalty to the buyer
otherwise. Fifth, the buyer meets its demand if the order is delivered successfully
or suffers a demand loss if the supply disrupts and no product is delivered to the
buyer.
We first analyze the suppliers’ equilibrium bidding strategies (here we only study
the symmetric bidding strategy), the buyer’s ex ante expected profits in the first-
and second-price auction formats, and the “revenue equivalence principle”. Then we
study how to choose the optimal penalty and discuss the efficiency of the mechanism.
4.1. First-price format APRA
In this subsection we study the suppliers’ equilibrium bidding strategies and the
buyer’s expected profit for the first-price APRA. For this case, the wholesale price
will be the winner’s bid when the winner successfully delivers the order. Then for
any given penalty p0, supplier i’s payoff function is
ΠA1,p0i (bi) =
{
(1 − θi)bi − ci − θip0 if bi < min
j =i
bj ,
0 otherwise,
(12)
where the superscript A1 indicates the first-price APRA.
For convenience, we define supplier i’s virtual cost with penalty p0 as zˆp0,i =
ci+θip0
1−θi when the penalty for no delivery is p0. Let the random variable Xp0,i denotes
the lowest virtual cost except supplier i, i.e., its realization is xp0,i = minj =i
cj+θjp0
1−θj ,
with its distribution function H , and density function h. By similar arguments as
previous section, H and h are common knowledge.
Similar to the virtual cost defined in Sec. 3.1, supplier i’s virtual cost with
penalty p0, zˆp0,i, represents the expected unit cost (including the penalty paid to
the buyer) if it wins the auction. It is increasing in the unit production cost ci, the
penalty p0, and the disruption probability θi.
The following proposition characterizes the suppliers’ equilibrium bidding
strategies.
Proposition 4. Supplier i’s equilibrium bidding strategy in the first-price ARPA is
βA1,p0(zˆp0,i) =
1
1−H(zˆp0,i)
∫ ∞
zˆp0,i
xh(x)dx. (13)
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Proof. We assume that the bidding strategy of supplier i in equilibrium is
βA1,p0(ci, θi) = bi. Note that the expected payoff function of supplier i when its
private information is (ci, θi) can be rewritten as follows:
ΠA1,p0i (bi) =
{
(1 − θi)(bi − zˆp0,i) if bi < min
j =i
bj,
0 otherwise.
By similar arguments to the proof of Proposition 1, we can derive that supplier
i’s equilibrium bidding strategy is
βA1,p0(ci, θi) = bi = βA1,p0(zˆp0,i) =
1
1−H(zˆp0,i)
∫ ∞
zˆp0,i
xh(x)dx.
Proposition 4 means that supplier i’s bidding policy depends on (ci, θi) and p0
through supplier i’s virtual cost with penalty p0, zˆp0,i =
ci+θip0
1−θi . This implies that
two suppliers will bid the same wholesale price if they have the same virtual cost
although they have different private information (ci, θi).
Now, we turn to the buyer’s problem. If the winner is suppler i, then the buyer’s
expected profit is
ΠA1,p0M = (1− θi)(r − wA1,p0(ci, θi))− θi(l − p0). (14)
For the first-price format, we have wA1,p0(ci, θi) = βA1,p0(zˆp0,i). Then the total
expected profit of the buyer is
E[ΠA1,p0M ] = N
∫ 1
0
∫ ωc
0
(
1−H
(
c + θp0
1− θ
))
× ((1− θ)(r − wA1,p0(c, θ))− θ(l − p0))fc(c)fθ(θ)dcdθ. (15)
4.2. Second-price format APRA
In this subsection we discuss the suppliers’ equilibrium bidding strategies and the
buyer’s expected profit in the second-price APRA. For this case, the lowest bid will
win the auction but the wholesale price will be the second lowest bid. Then, for any
given penalty p0, supplier i’s payoff function is
ΠA2,p0i (bi) =
{
(1− θi)b¯−i − ci − θip0 if bi < min
j =i
bj,
0 otherwise,
(16)
where b¯−i denotes the lowest bid among the other N − 1 suppliers except i and A2
indicates the second-price APAR. Proposition 5 characterizes the suppliers’ equi-
librium bidding strategies.
Proposition 5. Supplier i’s equilibrium bidding strategy in the second-price APRA
is given by
βA2,p0(ci, θi) = zˆp0,i =
ci + θip0
1− θi . (17)
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Proof. The proof is similar to that of Proposition 2. Here, we only sketch the
procedure. Consider supplier 1, say, and suppose that y = min{bj | j = 1} is the
second lowest bid. By bidding zˆp0,1, supplier 1 wins the auction if zˆp0,1 < y and loses
the auction otherwise. Suppose, however, that it bids another number z′′ < zˆp0,1. If
z′′ < zˆp0,1 < y, then it still wins the auction and makes a marginal profit y − zˆp0,1
for every successful product delivery. If z′′ < y < zˆp0,1, it will win the auction but
obtains a negative profit. If y < z′′ < zˆp0,1, it still loses the auction. Then we know
that bidding less than zˆp0,1 cannot generate more profit. Similarly, we can show
that it is not profitable for supplier 1 to bid more than zˆp0,1, either. Then supplier
1’s dominant strategy is to bid zˆp0,1.
This proposition indicates that “telling the truth (bidding the expected unit
cost)” is always a dominant strategy for all the suppliers, i.e., the second-price
ARPA is “incentive compatible”. Although the buyer cannot get the exact cost and
reliability information of the suppliers, the buyer knows the suppliers’ expected unit
costs for successful product delivery.
If the winner is suppler i, the buyer’s expected profit is
ΠA2,p0M = (1 − θi)
(
r − wA2,p0 (ci, θi)
)− θi(l − p0). (18)
For the second-price format, we have wA2,p0(ci, θi) = E[Xp0,i |Xp0,i ≥ zˆp0,i]. Then
the buyer’s expected total profit is
E[ΠA2,p0M ] = N
∫ 1
0
∫ ωc
0
(
1−H
(
c + θp0
1− θ
))
× ((1− θ)(r − wA2,p0(c, θ)) − θ(l − p0))fc(c)fθ(θ)dcdθ. (19)
4.3. APRA performance analysis
In this subsection we focus on comparing the first- and second-price formats, the
impact of the penalty p0 on the suppliers’ bidding strategies, and the winner deter-
mination problem. We also discuss the efficiency of the mechanism.
Compared with the price-only auction, the APRA has a similar structure of the
bidding strategies in equilibrium. In the price-only auction, zi plays a key role in
determining the winner of the auction and the probability of wining the auction,
while zˆp0,i plays the same role in the APRA.
First, we show that “revenue equivalence principle” holds in the APRA.
Proposition 6. The first- and second-price APRAs generate the same ex ante
expected profit for the buyer for a given penalty p0. In addition, the same supplier
will be selected as the winner under these two mechanisms.
Proof. Replacing zi by zˆp0,i and by similar arguments to those used in the proof
of Proposition 3, we can prove the proposition.
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Proposition 6 means that the first- and second-price APRAs generate the same
ex ante expected profit to the buyer. Hence, the buyer can choose either auction
format when it designs its procurement mechanism.
Now, we study the impact of the penalty p0 on the suppliers’ bidding strategies.
Since the first- and second-price APRAs are equivalent, we consider only the second-
price format.
Proposition 7. Compared to the price-only auction,
(1) For any given positive penalty p0, supplier i’s bid in the APRA is larger than
that in the price-only reverse auction.
(2) Suppliers’ bids in the APRA increase in the penalty p0.
(3) The expected bid that wins the auction (as well as the expected wholesale price
paid by the buyer) in the APRA is greater than that in the price-only reverse
auction.
Proof. From Proposition 5, supplier i’s biding strategy is βA2,p0(ci, θi) = zˆp0,i =
ci+θip0
1−θi . Since 0 < θi < 1, zˆp0,i is increasing in the penalty p0. When p0 = 0, the
APRA reduces to the price-only reverse auction. Thus, the first two parts hold.
Suppose that supplier 1 (with bid z1 = c11−θ1 ) wins in the price-only auction
and supplier k (with bid zˆp0,k =
ck+θkp0
1−θk , 1 ≤ k ≤ N) wins in the APRA. We have
z1 = c11−θ1 <
ck
1−θk ≤
ck+θkp0
1−θk . The bid that wins the auction for the APRA is greater
than that for the price-only reverse auction. Then the last part holds.
Next, we study the efficiency of the APRA.
Proposition 8. For any given pair of suppliers j and k with cj < ck and θj > θk,
there exists a unique p¯0 such that βA2,p0(zˆp0,j) > βA2,p0(zˆp0,k) for all p0 > p¯0.
Proof. Also by Proposition 5, we have βA2,p0(ci, θi) = zˆp0,i. If we view zˆp0,j and
zˆp0,k as two affine functions with respect to p0, then their slopes are
θj
1−θj and
θk
1−θk ,
respectively. Since θj > θk, we have
θj
1−θj >
θk
1−θk . Let p¯0 =
(1−θk)cj−(1−θj)ck
θk−θj , then
we have βA2,p0(zˆp0,j) > βA2,p0(zˆp0,k) for all p0 > p¯0.
From Proposition 7, we know that the suppliers’ bids and the wholesale price
paid by the buyer in the APRA are greater than those in the price-only reverse
auction. Moreover, the larger p0 is, the larger the bids are and the more the buyer
will pay. However, Proposition 8 shows that we can select a more reliable supplier
by increasing the announced penalty p0. On the other hand, the buyer has to pay
more if it chooses a more reliable supplier. Then the buyer can set a proper p0
to select the supplier with a proper production cost and supply reliability as the
winner as it wished. The buyer can set a small p0 if it prefers a low cost supplier or
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set a large p0 if it prefers a reliable supplier. The announced penalty p0 plays a key
role in balancing the cost and supply reliability.
Assumption 1. The suppliers’ real production costs and disruption probabilities
satisfy c1 ≤ c2 ≤ · · · ≤ cN and θ1 ≥ θ2 ≥ · · · ≥ θN .
Please note that if supplier i is dominated by supplier j (i.e., cj ≤ ci and θj ≤ θi),
supplier i cannot win the auction for any p0 in our mechanism. Therefore, we could
exclude all such suppliers that are dominated by some suppliers from the supplier
pool. The rest suppliers satisfy Assumption 1, and for any p0, the result will be
the same when compared to original auction without exclusion. Because of this, we
make this assumption to simply the analysis.
Proposition 9. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds and let supplier k be the most
efficient supplier
(1) If k = 1 or N, then there exists a unique p∗0 such that the APRA is efficient.
(2) If 1 < k < N and 0 ≤ (1−θk)ci−(1−θi)ckθk−θi ≤
(1−θk)cj−(1−θj)ck
θk−θj for any given
supplier i(i < k) and supplier j(j > k), then there exists p∗0 > 0 such that the
APRA is efficient.
Proof. For a given announced penalty p0, when supplier m is selected, the total
profit of the supply chain consisting of supplier m and the buyer is
S(p0) = (1− θm)(r − wA)− θm(l − p0) + ((1− θm)wA − cm)− θmp0
= (1− θm)r − cm − θml. (20)
Since supplier k is the most efficient supplier, for any supplier m = k, we have
(1− θk)r − ck − θkl ≥ (1− θm)r − cm − θml, (21)
i.e.,
cm − ck ≥ (r + l)(θk − θm). (22)
Now, we prove that there exists a penalty p0 such that the APRA is efficient.
Note that if the APRA with p0 is efficient, for any m = k, we must have
ck + θkp0
1− θk ≤
cm + θmp0
1− θm . (23)
Now, we discuss the choice of p0. There are two cases:
(1) i < k. From Proposition 8, we have that supplier k dominates all the other
suppliers for all p0 ≥ p¯0 = (1−θk)ci−(1−θi)ckθk−θi ;
(2) j > k. Also from Proposition 8, we have that supplier k dominates all the other
suppliers for all p0 ≤ p¯′0 = (1−θk)cj−(1−θj)ckθk−θj .
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Table 2. The suppliers’ production cost
and disruption probabilities.
Supplier Production Disruption
cost probability
i 17.5 0.2
k 17.6 0.18
j 18.6 0.1
Fig. 2. The bidding strategies with respect to p0.
Thus, the condition 0 ≤ p¯0 ≤ p¯′0 ensures that we can choose p0 (p¯0 ≤ p0 ≤ p¯′0)
such that the APRA is efficient.
Example 2. Suppose that there are three suppliers, whose production costs and
disruption probabilities are given by Table 2.
It is easy to check that supplier k is the most efficient. But the condition
0 ≤ (1−θk)ci−(1−θi)ckθk−θi ≤
(1−θk)cj−(1−θj)ck
θk−θj does not hold. Figure 2 illustrates the
suppliers’ equilibrium strategies with respect to the change of p0. From Fig. 2, we
see that supplier k will never win in the APRA for any p0 ≥ 0. So the APRA is not
efficient for any p0 ≥ 0.
5. Numerical Studies
In this section, we conducted numerical studies to explore the impacts of some
parameters on the buyer’s ex ante expected profit and the social welfare for the
proposed auctions. We also investigate the impact of the pre-announced penalty
on winner determination. We set the parameters as follows: N = 5, r = 5, l = 2,
ωc = 3, and p0 = 4. Random variable C and Θ are uniform distributed on (0, ωc)
and (0, 1), respectively.
First, we study how the announced penalty p0 affects the buyer’s ex ante
expected profit and the social welfare. Figure 3 shows the results. From Fig. 3, we
see that the buyer’s ex ante expected profit first increases in p0 and then decreases
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Fig. 3. The impact of penalty on the buyer’s expected profit and social welfare.
Fig. 4. The impact of number of suppliers on suppliers’ bids.
in p0, and the social welfare first increases in p0 and then decreases slowly. This
means that a proper announced penalty can help the buyer choose the most efficient
supplier. However, if p0 is too large, the buyer will pay more to the winner since a
large p0 will force suppliers to make large bids (Proposition 7). As shown in Table 4,
we can easily calculate the optimal p0 for the second-price APRA.
Next we study the impacts of the number of suppliers on the suppliers’ bids, the
buyer’s expected profit, and the social welfare. As we know, competition intensity
increases in the number of suppliers. Figures 4 and 5 show the results.
Figure 4 shows that the supplier’s bid decreases quickly first and then changes
slowly. Figure 5 shows that the buyer’s ex ante expected profit is increasing rapidly
at first and then slows down as the number of suppliers increases. This means that
proper competition can bring profit to the buyer. So the buyer should maintain a
relative large pool of potential suppliers, but need not keep a huge set of suppliers
because keeping suppliers will result in cost but bring little marginal profit to the
buyer. From Fig. 5, we also see that the social welfare increases in the number of
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Fig. 5. The impact of number of suppliers on the buyer’s expected profit and social welfare.
suppliers. Competition can also increase social welfare and increase social efficiency.
In addition, the profit of the supplier, i.e., the gap between the social welfare/profit
and the buyer’s profit, decreases as the number of suppliers increases. This means
that fierce competition can help the buyer extort suppliers’ profit.
We next examine the determinant of the winner with regarding to the pre-
announced penalty p0. Consider five suppliers, whose unit production costs and
disruption reliabilities are given in Table 3. Column 3 gives the social welfare when
the supplier is the winner of the auction. Obviously, supplier 2 is the most efficient.
We only consider the second-price APRA for convenience since the first- and
secondprice APRAs are equivalent. Table 4 shows the winner of the auction with
respect to different penalties.
From Table 4, we could find that the APRA could select different suppli-
ers as winners with different penalties. Combined with the results in Table 3, it
shows that the most efficient supplier, Supplier 2, will win the auction only when
Table 3. Suppliers’ information.
Supplier Production Disruption Social
cost probability welfare
1 2.81 0.031 1.973
2 1.85 0.141 2.163∗
3 1.51 0.229 1.887
4 0.84 0.287 2.151
5 0.67 0.367 1.761
Note: ∗The most efficient supplier.
Table 4. Winner of the auction.
Penalty [0, 0.675) (0.675, 4.092) (4.0925.647)∗ (5.647,∞)
Winner Supplier 5 Supplier 4 Supplier 2 Supplier 1
Note: ∗The APRA achieves social efficiency.
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p0 ∈ (4.092, 5.647), which means the social efficiency is achieved. When the penalty
is small, the suppliers with low production costs (e.g., Supplier 5 and 4) are more
competitive in the auction. On the other hand, when the penalty is large, the suppli-
ers with low disruption probabilities (e.g., Supplier 2 and 1) will win the auction. As
a result, the buyer can choose its preferred supplier by adjusting the pre-announced
penalty p0. The more reliable the buyer prefers, the larger p0 should be set.
6. Conclusions
In this paper we study the procurement auction design problem considering sup-
ply disruption. We first consider the price-only auction in which the buyer ignores
the supply disruption risk when it designs the procurement mechanism and there
is no penalty when the winner cannot deliver the product. We characterize the
suppliers’ equilibrium bidding strategies and show that the first-price and second-
price auctions generate the same ex ante expected profit to the buyer. That is,
the well known “revenue equivalence principle” holds. We give an example to show
that the price-only auction is not efficient. We then propose the APRA as a new
and easy-to-implement auction mechanism. We show that the “revenue equiva-
lence principle” holds for the APRA and it is efficient. We provide numerical
results to show the impacts of the penalty parameter and the number of suppli-
ers on the buyer’s and social ex ante expected profits, as well as the suppliers’
bids.
There are some research topics that can be further studied as follows: in this
work we assume that the order is indivisible and only one supplier is selected as the
winner. As supplier diversification is a commonly used method to mitigate supply
risk, extending the results in this paper to the case where the order is divisible
and more than one supplier can be selected as the winner is an interesting and
challenging topic.
In this study suppliers only bid the wholesale price although we consider two
attributes, i.e., the price and the supply reliability. We use a penalty to force the
supplier with a low production cost but a high disruption risk not to bid too low. In
this way, we can select an efficient supplier as the winner. We can consider another
mechanism, e.g., the VCG-type auction. The suppliers bid their production costs
and disruption probabilities, and the winner and wholesale prices are specified by
the auction.
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